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VIETNAM HINDSIGHT

PART I: HOW IT BEGAN

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PART I: HOW IT BEGAN

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PEOPLE WHO WERE INTERVIEWED FOR VIETNAM HINDSIGHT IN ORDER OF THEIR APPEARANCE AND POSITION HELD AT THE TIME

GEORGE BALL Under-Secretary of State 1961-1966

MAXWELL TAYLOR Military Adviser to JFK - 1961 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 1962-64

JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH Ambassador to India 1961-63

DAVID HALBERSTAM Correspondent - New York Times - Vietnam 1962-63

WALT M. ROSTOW Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National Security 1961-64

MME. NHU Wife of Ngo Dinh Nhu, sister-in-law of Ngo Dinh Diem

ARTHUR SCHLESINGER Special Assistant to the President 1961-64

PAUL HARKINS US Military Commander - Vietnam 1962-64

JOHN VANN American Military Adviser in Vietnam

MICHAEL FORRESTAL Senior Member - White House National Security Staff 1962-66

ROGER HILSMAN Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs 1963-64

RUFUS PHILLIPS American AID Mission - Vietnam FREDERICK NOLTING U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam 1961-63

LT. COL. LUCIEN CONEIN CIA - Vietnam 1961-64

DEAN RUSK Secretary of State 1961-69

GENERAL TON THAT DINH Military Governor - Saigon 1963

GENERAL DO MAU Director - Military Security 1963

MA TUYEN Leader - Saigon Chinese Community

COL. DUONG NGOC LAM Director - Civilian Guard

GENERAL NGUYEN KHANH Commander - Second Corps - ARVN 1963

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ACT I

MONTAGE OF VN PEASANTS AT WORK

4 SHOT GIRLS ON SIDE OF ROAD

SUPER: HOW IT BEGAN

MS COWS IN FIELD

SUPER: REPORTED BY FLOYD KALBER

SCOOTER GOES BY

(MUSIC UP) FATHERS ARE PLEADING MOTHERS ARE ALL ALONE MOTHERS ARE PRAYING SEND OUR SONS BACK HOME

MONTAGE CU AMERICAN SOLDIERS

VN WAR SCENES

BRING THE BOYS HOME BRING THEM BACK ALIVE BRING THE BOYS HOME BRING THEM BACK ALIVE (Chorus) BRING THE BOYS HOME BRING THEM BACK ALIVE

KALBER (VO)

This is the first of two programs about this war where 32,000 Americans died.

MONTAGE OF WEARY GI FACES

MONTAGE OF WOUNDED GIS &

SLOW ZOOM TO CU JFK IN OFFICE

KALBER (VO)

About the decisions he made as President of the United States · about the war.

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PULL BACK TO CORPSE OF DIEM About the death of Ngo Dinh Diem who was President of Vietnam.

KALBER (VO)

MONTAGE OF WOUNDED GIS

About how his death and the decisions that let to his death changed the nature of this war and changed our part in it. About how we got there and why we got there.

KALBER (VO)

On January 20, 1961, the United States had 400 men in Vietnam. In November 1963 we had 16,000.

MONTAGE OF TANKS AND

SOLDIERS

CU OF GI FACE

We had become partners in a war in Asia against Asians. How did that happen?

KALBER (SOF)

To the degree that we in the media paid any attention at all to that small dirty war in those years, we almost wholly reported the position of the government. We had no more foresight about what that war would become than the men in Washington

who made the decisions. We did not foresee and we did not understand. Thus, this program and the one that will follow tomorrow night are for one thing, an exercise in hindsight.

I-p/3

KALBER (SOF)

But we believe that hindsight is necessary. Vietnam has been an American failure. That is now generally agreed. What is important is to understand why, why we acted as we did knowing and believing what we did then.

KALBER (SOF)

Vietnam has been called a quagmire into which we blundered not knowingwhat we were doing. It has been said that the system, the bureaucracy worked too well. It has been called an adventure in United States imperialism.

KALBER (VO)

This is an attempt to see the events and options as they looked to the men who made the decisions that got us into a war that no one really wanted.

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M/2 SHOT OF SOLDIERS

DRAGGING BODY OF PRISONER

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ACT II

SLOW ZOOM IN TO WHITE HOUSE

KALBER (VO)

John F. Kennedy was President of

the United States for 1056 days.

SLOW ZOOM IN TO JFK

SPLIT SCREEN: JFK/ MONTAGE OF WAR SCENES IN LOAS, CONGO, CUBA, ALGERIA BERLIN. NUCLEAR BOMB EXPLOSION There is civil war in Laos, the Congo, Algeria, the invasion of the Bay of Pigs, the Berlin wall. The resumption of nuclear testing by the Soviet Union.

There is also -- still small and

still far away -- a war in Vietnam.

LS VN SOLDIERS IN ACTION

DEAD BODY OF DIEM

GILPATRIC (SOF)

I only say by way of comparison that Vietnam was the terra incognita compared to the western world...

GILPATRIC (VO)

... Our orientation had been principally

in the countries forming the periphery of the Soviet Union. And other than the Korean experience the, not

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CU

CU/BUDDHA

2 SHOT MEN AT ALTAR

many of us had the first hand

MONTAGE OF MONTAGNARD DANCE

knowledge of the...the conditions in Southeast Asia.

PAM HILL (VO)

Was there ever any kind of dialogue about the advisability of getting into Vietnam?

BALL (SOF)

I think the President, er President Kennedy had considerable reservations about it, but at the same time he had a very strong feeling that the communist powers were in an expansionist mood and he was not prepared

CU/JFK PAN TO BALL - STILLS

CU/STILL MAXWELL TAYLOR

to see us abdicate leadership or / responsibility in Vietnam.

TAYLOR (VO)

I know of nobody, I heard of no one in this period

TAYLOR (SOF)

who opposed the broad goal, the

MS

II-p/2

CU GEORGE BALL

prevention of the imposition of a communist government on the state of South Vietnam against the will of its inhabitants. No one challenged that that I ever heard.

GALBRAITH (SOF)

The assumption as to whether we should stay in Vietnam or not, was almost, this is a shocking business, there was almost no discussion of that. And er, there were two reasons for that I think. There was first the unwillingness of anybody who seemed to be so weak, that he would say in effect, the United States should walk out of a situation or difficulty of this sort. A weakness was readily equated with you know, being soft on communism.

GALBRAITH (VO)

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The other and more important thing was, if you said

MS JOHN K. GALBRAITH

LS/NSC MEETING

2 SHOT MCNAMARA/JOHNSON

MCU JFK/STILL

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MS RUSK/STILL

MS GALBRAITH/STILL

ZOOM IN TO CU/GALBRAITH

SOLDIERS ACTION SCENES

VC CAPTURE

PAN ARVN

let's pull out,

this is a hopeless situation,

then you

excluded yourself from all further discussion. "Well, don't get Galbraith into that discussion he has taken a way-out position. He's wild, he just said

we should pull out, so he's a waste of time."

KALBER (VO)

Thus, as the new administration begins to consider what to do in Vietnam,

no one considers whether the United States should be there at all.

There is no examination of the nature of the war of the government we are supporting, of the

roots of the insurgency against it.

MONTAGE/SV PEASANT FACES/ ANGUISH

SOLDIERS CAPTURE VC

We assume that Vietnam is our responsibility and that we should be

II-p/4

there.

KALBER (VO)

PAN DOWN FROM CAPITOL BLDG.

3

The commitment in Southeast Asia goes back to the decision of President Truman to support the return of the French to Indochina after World War II.

MS TRAVEL SHOT CAR ENTERING GATE

IKE GREETS JFK

MS/IKE & JFK

PULL BACK FROM FLAG PAN CAPITOL BLDG. close to ordering a nuclear strike to save Dien Bien Phu.

In its name President Eisenhower came

In its name we pay 78% of Vietnam's military budget. Now Eisenhower passes the commitment

on to John F. Kennedy,

as it was passed on to him.

No one questions it. This is the ' time of the bi-partisan foreign policy. The men who are leaving and the

MS/RUSK TRAVEL SHOT MS/MCNAMARA TRAVEL SHOT MS CAPITOL BLDG.

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men who are coming in share the same beliefs and experiences.

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r.,

MS GILPATRIC

MONTAGE OF ARVN ACTION SHOTS

II-p/6

GILPATRIC (VO)

At that time the view within the administration was conditioned by two principal factors. One was the Korean experience in which a number of

GILPATRIC (SOF)

us had participated: Dean Rusk, myself, Alexis Johnson, Max Taylor and others. The second condition which affected us all was the, the Khrushchev speech on national liberation in January, early January of 1961, which indicated to us that the Soviet Union was going to press the expansion of communist power world-wide, principally by means of wars of national liberation.

KALBER (VO)

In Vietnam there is such a war. Khrushehev's words have a strong impact on Kennedy. They shape his thinking about Vietnam. In fact, Khrushchev does not intend to fight a war there. he is responding to Peking's challenge to his leadership. But Kennedy does not know this. In Vietnam he sees the United State as the defender of a free nation menaced by communist insurgency. This is <u>not</u> how Vietnam looks to some in the field.

HALBERSTAM (VO)

What you had in South Vietnam was essentially a feudal society coming

apart, this was really a kind of dying ember. The...this was the end of a country which had been touched by revolution.

KALBER (VO)

David Halberstam reported the war for the New York Times. He has continued to study that period and is writing a book about it.

HALBERSTAM (SOF)

And we were trying to do was invent a non-communist er, 'anti-colonialist nationalism. And the only problem was that no such thing existed.

MS/STILL

ARVN ACTION SHOTS

PAN DEAD VC BODY

CU DAVID HALBERSTAM

II--p/7

KALBER (VO)

PAN OF VN CHILDREN FACES

What does exist is a nation created by an agreement among the great powers at Geneva.

KALBER (VO)

TRAVEL SHOT DIEM REVIEWING TROOPS

At its head is Ngo Dinh Diem, chosen with United States assistance in 1954. He is shy, withdrawn, ascetic, a stobborn man, proud, suspicious, a deeply religious Catholic in a Buddhist country.

In 7 years he has suppressed all opposition. With

our support he has refused to hold the elections

agreed to at Geneva.

KALBER (VO)

One of the first things Kennedy learns is that Diem is losing the war. Gen. Edward Lansdale, a Veteran of Indochina, our best expert on guerilla war, the man who helped beat the Huks in the Phillipines,

MS DIEM

e., E.,

MS NOLTING & VN OFFICIAL

CU DIEM

LS AIR DROP & PEASANTS COLLECTING PACKAGES has just been in Vietnam.

MCU LANSDALE STILL

MS ROSTOW STILL

CU

KALBER (VO)

He has written a secret report. It is one of the first things Kennedy sees when he becomes President.

Walt Rostow brings it to him

ROSTOW (VO)

I said I had a memo that I thought the President should read.

ROSTOW (SOF)

President Kennedy told me he only had a half-hour that day, he had another appointment and that did I still want him to read it then? I said yes sir, all of it, yes sir.

And he er, read it through. He could read quickly and retentively and he looked up and said this is the worst one we've got, isn't it?

MS WALT ROSTOW

PAN FROM PAPER TO JFK FACE & ZOOM IN TO XCU CU JFK & ZOOM IN TO %CU

MLS SHRIVERS AT GALA

MLS OF NEW MEN ARRIVING

(JOHNSON, MCNAMARA, RFK AND WIVES)

n, , '

And he said, you know, Eisenhower never mentioned Vietnam, we talked about Laos but never Vietnam.

KALBER (VO)

In January 1961 new men take power. they are a generation who believe American know-how can solve any problem, manage any crisis. They believe in what Dean Rusk calls "our enormous capacity to shape the course of events".

GALBRAITH (SOF)

This was a period in our history when reputations were being made in foreign policy.

A goodly number of people were saying, now if I'm...I'm just associated with the right crisis at the right time, the right association with the Pentagon, the right approach to military force, I will be the great man that nobody but my wife ever suspected me of being

CU GALBRAITH

AT GALA:

MS JFK INAUGURAL CROWD

MS TRAVEL SHOT JACKIE AT INAUGRURAL BALL

LS OF INAUGURAL BALL

LS OF INAUGURATION

MS JFK AT PODIUM

LS OF INAUGURAL CROWD

before, and so there was an enthusiasm for crises.

KENNEDY (VO)

Let the word go forth

from this time and place to friend and foe alike that

JFK (SOF)

the torch has been passed to a new generation of Americans...

KALBER (VO)

John F. Kennedy is a man caught between two times. Between old myths and new realities. He opposed the French in Vietnam. He opposed sending United States troops.

He said it was hard to fight a war where the enemy was not seen as the enemy,

PAN CROWD

yet now he sees himself in a global conflict with communism. And Vietnam is a part of that conflict.

MS JFK

KENNEDY (SOF)

PAN CROWD TO REAR OF JFK ... to which we are committed today at home and around the world.

APPLAUSE

KENNEDY (SOF)

Let every nation know whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty.

FREEZE JFK

SUPER TITLE: VIETNAM HINDSIGHT

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II-p/12

MS

SHOTS OF INAUGURAL SCENE PULL BACK FROM JFK AT LECTERN

MS

KENNEDY (SOF)

In the long history of the world only a few generations have been granted the role of defending freedom in its hour of maximum danger. I do not shrink from this responsibility. I welcome it.

APPLAUSE

KALBER (VO)

93 days later Kennedy has been humiliated at the Bay of Pigs. On the day when the last prisoner is taken on the beach in Cuba, Kennedy sets in motion a review of United States Vietnam policy. He gives the Second assignment to Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric.

GILPATRIC (SOF)

The first approach was rather tentative -- rather experimental. Witness for example, the decision of the President to appoint me, a Defense Department Official, as the head of the first task force to investigate a problem, which, at that stage, was primarily political.

MONTAGE OF CAPTURED PRISONERS

CU GILPATRIC

KALBER (VO

GILPATRIC MS/STILL

Gilpatric is asked to recommend a series of actions "overt and/or covert" which in his opinion "will prevent communist domination of that country."

GILPATRIC (SOF)

The President seemed to me to be, at times rather irked or, distracted by having to focus his attention on Vietnam as opposed to the problems of the Atlantic Alliance, the relations with the Soviet Union and..and this kind of competitve contest with Khrushchev which, which fascinated him and...and a ...occupied a good deal of his thinking and time.

KALBER (VO)

Six months later the President is still locked in the contest with Khrushchev, and the small war in southeast Asia, which he sees as part of that contest, is being lost.

KENNEDY (SOF

You will recall that in my recent address to the United Nations General Assembly I

CU GILPATRIC

MS TRAVEL SHOT JFK PRESS CONFERENCE

LS JFK AT LECTERN PRESS CONFERENCE

expressed concern of this government over the situation in southeast Asia, particularly on the attacks on the

people of South Vietnam. With this

situation in mind I've asked General

Taylor with the wholehearted endorse-

ment of Secretary McNamara and Gen.

Lemnitzer

SLOW ZOOM IN TO MS

PAN PRESS REPS.

to go to Saigon this week to discuss with the President and American officials on the spot ways in which we can perhaps assist the government of Vietnam in meeting this

threat to its independence.

CORRESPONDENT (VO)

Can you give us your appraisal of the conditions under which you might find it necessary to send troops in?

KENNEDY (SOF)

As you know in the last two or three months there has been a large increase in the number of the forces that have been involved. There has been evidences that some of these forces have come from

MS

MLS JFK

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beyond the frontiers and...Gen. Taylor will give me the...and the Joint Chiefs of Staff an educated military guess as to what the situation that the government there faces and we can come to conclusions as to what is best to do.

2 SHOT TAYLOR & ROSTOW

KALBER (VO)

The key fact is that this mission is headed by a military man.

PAN MILITARY SALUTE TAYLOR

MS TAYLOR & ROSTOW

Former army Chief of Staff, former commander in Korea.

Number 2 man in the mission is Presidential adviser, Walt Rostow.

ROSTOW (VO <u>ROSTOW</u> (VO) As of 1961

ROSTOW (VO)

it was a war clearly directed from the outside. The Viet Cong and the communist party of South Vietnam was simply a part of the Communist Party of Vietnam which was run from Hanoi.

CU ROSTOW

In my judgment without the role of infiltration and without the role of the leadership in the north...even in 1961 the problem in the South would have been manageable.

KALBER (VO)

These judgment will be the basis for the report on the nature of the Vietnam

crisis that Taylor's mission will bring back to the President.

TAYLOR (SOF)

We arrived in Saigon at a time where... when the local situation, both military, political and psychological, was at a low ebb.

And there was great fear in Saigon

that we might indeed sell Vietnam down the river, so to speak,

by a week or ineffective settlement in Laos. Next there was great discouragement over the course of the war.

Finally in the south, in the Mekong

MS TAYLOR & ROSTOW

AT AIRPORT

CU TAYLOR

MS TAYLOR

3 SHOT-TAYLOR NOLTING, ROSTOW

DIEM AND VN OFFICIALS IN PALACE

MS TAYLOR & NOLTING WITH DIEM

PAN OF FLOOD AREA

MCU

Delta, there was the greatest flood that had ever devastated that area in this century. So a combination of circumstances made it a very gloomy period indeed.

KALBER(VO)The United States now has 400 advisersin Vietnam. Gen. Taylor proposes that6,000 troops be brought in to help withflood relief.

MME. NHU (SOF)

They started under the pretext of the flood which happened to us to send 6,000 GIs to help for the flood. We were amazed...of course we said, Oh this is very good...this is very nice of you to help us, but do you not think it is a little too much?

ROSTOW (SOF)

What we proposed essentially was one, a system of advisers...it would run from the palace down to the villages to help strengthen the military and civil administration of the country. Two quite a lot of hardware that would

MS AMERICAN ADVISERS WITH ARVN

CU MME NHU

MCU ROSTOW

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help, the most notable being, the development of aircraft units...air... airforce units for the South Vietnamese and helicopters.

In addition we proposed that a unit... an American unit be put in at that time for several purposes, one of them being to strengthen morale and symbolize the seriousness of our commitment, er, to South Vietnam. The second was as a reserve force and third we wanted it to be an engineering, engineering unit that could help with the flood and when the flood was over, they could build roads, airfields, and do other logistical jobs.

FREED (VO)

There's no doubt in your mind that er, if the situation got bad enough, or even as it existed then, there might be need for American units who would actually have to do fighting...?

ROSTOW (SOF)

That is right.

MONTAGE OF AM HARDWARE AND EQUIPMENT ON DOCK

PAN PILE UP ON DOCK AREA

MS ROSTOW

MS

III.- p/8

TAYLOR (SOF)

I thought to bring the forces in rather underlining, underscoring this task, the flood task...was good from many points of view. Good, good news to the South Vietnamese, a humanitarian motion, er, motive of er, genuine importance and also when the flood was over if indeed by that time we had discovered that...that the presence of our forces didn't have the effect that we had expected then we had a good reason to withdraw them.

We'd say they came...we...we repaired flood damage and then went home. So it gave us an out if you want to put it that way

which I thought had considerable... might have considerable value.

KALBER (VO)

Not all the advice Kennedy gets supports Gen. Taylor's recommendations.

GALBRAITH (VO)

I was mostly horrified by the proposal that we send in 'troops into the delta.

MS TAYLOR

PAN DOWN FROM JFK TO DESK

PAN UP TO MS JFK

MS JFK & PULL BACK

LS JFK

GALBRAITH (SOF)

This seemed to me to be such a fraudulent suggestion that there was no chance of it washing, but also it meant that we would from that point on have a military commitment there.

BALL (SOF)

I talked with Secretary McNamara, I talked with Secretary Rusk. I told them that I thought that the acceptance of the recommendations of the Taylor/Rostow report could very well lead to the commitment of forces to Asia...in fact I said that in my view if we went down this road we might find ourselves with 300,000 men in 5 years time in the jungles and paddies of South Vietnam. They didn't agree with me. I then indicated that I wanted to discuss this with President Kennedy which I did.

KALBER (VO)

The President listens to Ball's prediction and then he says, "you're crazier than hell."

<u>SCHLESINGER</u> (VO) President Kennedy said to me one

ZOOM IN TO XCU JFK

MLS JFK & MILITARY LEADERS AT FT. BRAGG

MS GEORGE BALL

CU GALBRAITH

afternoon they want a force of American troops out there. They say it is necessary in order to restoreconfidence. But the President went on, it will be just like Berlin.

SCHLESINGER (SOF)

Troops will march in and in 4 days everyone will have forgotten, then we will be told we will have to send in more troops. It's like taking a drink, the effect wears off and then you have to take another.

MLS JFK AT FT. BRAGG

CU ARTHUR SCHLESINGER

KALBER (VO)

The President is at Fort Bragg to review the 82nd Airborne. He has decided to send helicopters to Vietnam. He will send 300 more advisers even though this violates the Geneva agreement.

In the end Kennedy does not follow Gen. Taylor's recommendation.

MONTAGE OF FT. BRAGG He does not send combat troops to DISPLAY Vietnam. But the Taylor report has a decisive effect on our Vietnam commitment.

PAN FT. BRAGG AREA

3 SHOT BOMBERS

MONTAGE OF FT. BRAGG

MONTAGE OF GIS IN HAND TO HAND COMBAT PRACTICE

FORT BRAGG ACTION SHOTS

3

It assumes the need for a United States presence in Vietnam. It does not ask, as Rusk has, whether Diem is giving us "something worth supporting."

It commits the United States to a military not a political solution. And, on the basis of Gen. Taylor's report the President will decide that the price of

not committing ourselves to save Vietnam is too high.

GALBRAITH (SOF)

I heard him say many times, a number of times, now, there...there are Ass just so many defeats, there are just so many concessions that one can make to the communists in one year and survive politically. In 1961 he liquidated the Cuban, the Bay of Pigs thing, Er... er very quickly and on terms which invited er, criticism. The military wanted to go ahead as usual. He had called off the hawks in Laos and gone for the er...negotiations in Geneva

CU GALBRAITH

MS JFK

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and I remember his saying we, we just can't er...we just can't have another defeat this year in Vietnam.

MS HARKINS ARRIVES IN SAIGON

KALBER (VO)

Part of the American buildup is the new United States military commander. Paul Harkins, a four-star general.

HARKINS (SOF)

Well I don't think that er...I ever had the experience to deal with the kind of a war I ran into in Vietnam. It is entirely different from the wars I'd been in World War II and Korea. It was a war over there in Vietnam that families were either mixed up in it, opposed to each other-- there was no way that you could really pick out the enemy -- they were all dressed in the same kind of uniform -- black slacks and black jackets and a straw hat and it was very difficult to determine who you were fighting at the time I was there.

GILPATRIC (SOF)

General Harkins went out to Vietnam

MS PAUL HARKINS

CU GILPATRIC

and from that point on the regular military establishment er...er, took over and its thinking tended to prevail as against the what I might call the amateurs, who were...who were trying to be innovative and experimental and who, who weren't satisfied that er, that the regular army training and tactics would suffice in this new environment we found ourselves.

MONTAGE OF COMBAT HELICOPTERS

KALBER (VO)

There are now 1364 Americans in Vietnam. 14 Americans died in Vietnam in 1961.

CORRESPONDENT (VO)

Sir, what are you going to do about American soliders getting killed in Vietnam?

KENNEDY (SOF)

Well I'm as a...I'm extremely concerned about American soldiers who are in a great many areas in hazord. We are attempting to help Vietnam maintain its independence and not fall under the domination of the communists.

MS JFK AT PRESS CONFERENCE

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FRED RHEINSTEIN (VO)

SHOTS OF SOLDIERS ON PATROL

SHOTS OF GIS IN HAMLET

MONTAGE OF HELICOPTER IN SEARCH 4 days ago another patrol just like this one with the code name RED BALL moved down this road to a fly speck hamlet named AN CHAW. At 7:04 this hot Sunday April morning, in a war that isn't a war, where Americans fight but they don't fight, RED BALL is in trouble. "Flag Pole, Flag Pole this is Red Ball, we're encircled, under attack from all sides."

Then James Gabriel said loudly to his radio, "we're being over-run," and that was the last ever heard from Red Ball.

The choppers recklessly brush treetops and slip through ravines. American eyes strain to find Red Ball and then a white spot under a clump of trees. You can't see what it is but you know.

SOLDIERS SEARCH FIELD

And then look and find.

2 SHOT SOLDIERS & DEAD RED BALL PATROL FREEZE

"Oh God" he said, "Oh my God."

SUPER

IV-p/1

AMERICAN MILITARY HARDWARE

KALBER (VO)

In Vietnam as 1962 begins we have decided to apply our technology to a guerilla war. We believe that if we give our side the right weapons, support them with enough technology, the war can be won.

What is hardly noticed is that in raising the scale of firepower we have widened the scale of the war.

There are 5500 Americans in Vietnam. Not as many as his advisers have proposed. More than Kennedy wants to be there. But he sees no alternative.

In the councils of the President, a significant thing has happened. The Secretary of Defense, not the Secretary of State, has become his chief adviser on Vietnam.

Secretary Rusk was somewhat skeptical About American Troop commitment to Vietnam. Moreover in a number of ways the State Department in 1961 disappointed the President when it came to...to getting things done quickly and effectively.

SCHLESINGER (VO) And I think both these things may have

led the

MONTAGE VN WAR SCENES

2SHOT OF GIS WALKING MS GI SMOKING

MS GIS DISTRIBUTING FOOD TO VN CHILDREN

FREEZE ON MCNAMARA & ZOOM

CU SCHLESINGER

CU/STILL MCNAMARA & JFK

3 SHOT/STILL . MCN, JFK, RUSK

MONTAGE OF MCNAMARA CU SHOTS

PULL BACK FROM XCU

CU SCHLESINGER

MCU MCNAMARA

President to give major authority for Vietnam in '62 and '63

to Secretary McNamara and the Defense Department. I think he felt that Secretary McNamara had the qualities of energy and er...

decisiveness that this problem needed.

SCHLESINGER (SOF)

I think it was a great error not because of the abilities of Secretary McNamara but because it helped the general assumption throughout the government that Vietnam was a military problem.

MCNAMARA (SOF)

In these conflicts of which the present confrontation in southeast Asia is an excellent example, the force of world communism operates in the twillight zone between political subversion and military ...or quasi-military action. The military tactics are those of the sniper, the ambush, the raid. The political tactics , are those of extortion, of assassination, terror and we must help the people of these threatened countries to resist

KALBER (VO)

He believes in technology, in efficiency, in statistics.

He is forceful, brilliant.

He is convinced that American technology properly applied in proper amounts can solve any problem. He sees Vietnam as a management problem.

GILPATRIC (VO)

The tab management is often applied to McNamara. I think it's a shorthand way of saying

GILPATRIC (SOF)

that he addressed every problem, whether it was the closing of a base or, our role in Vietnam.

GILPATRIC (VO)

as something which should be approached in an orderly, organized fashion and he is a man of great neatness and efficiency of thinking and of effort and he applied that approach to whatever

PAN UP FROM BOOK TO MCU MCNAMARA/STILL

MCNAMARA AT AIR SHOW SCENES OF AIR SHOW

MCN ACTION SHOTS

MS MCNAMARA AT AIRPORT

CU GILPATRIC

MS MCN ACTION

he undertook, large or small.

KALBER (VO)

In the end it will come to be called McNamara's war. But that will be because the President of the United States will allow it to happen. For McNamara, Vietnam will become a testing ground for what he believes about the scientific application of the United States' power.

It will become an obsession to which he returns again and again.

KALBER (VO)

In 1962 McNamara is in Vietnam he is told things are going well. The Generals he talks to assure him with charts and statistics. Only people in the field have doubts.

HALBERSTAM (SOF)

You had a marvelous system of lying that the American Military had built up. You know reporting really should go from the ground up.

HALBERSTAM (VO)

Well this reporting went the other way. It went from Washington to MACV Saigon and then down until Washington was in a

3 SHOT FIGHTER PLANES LEAVING CARRIER

MCNAMARA ACTION SHOTS

TRAVEL SHOT MCNAMARA & ARMY PERSONNELL

MILITARY HEADQUARTERS -

SAIGON

MS AM & VN AT CONFERENCE

ł

CU HALBERSTAM

IV-p/4

IV-p/5

way telling MACV what it wanted to hear and MACV was implanting down to the field what it wanted to hear and then

MS MCNAMARA ON INSPECTION TOUR eventually the field would tell MACV what it wanted to hear if it wanted to get promoted and then it would go back to Washington and Washington would say isn't this marvelous...we're doing so well.

VANN (VO)

I used to despair because Secretary McNamara and others would come here and would go out on pre-arranged; rehearsed itineraries and briefings, all of which emphasized the good points and skipped lightly over er...the difficulties

VANN (SOF)

We think that er, if we're given a job to do it's a sign of weakness to tell our superiors about the problems. We have that old agressive er, can-do attitude and this er, this has certainly carried the United States to a position

MONTAGE OF MCNAMARA ACTION SHOTS IN VN

& VN OFFICIALS

MS MCNAMARA WITH AM

CU JOHN VANN

of

a world power. But there comes a time when sledge hammers can't work on gnats. And er, one of these times was Vietnam.

PHILLIPS (SOF)

We fell in love with statistics and this was one...one of our real problems in Vietnam and I think in part this was McNamara's fault because he stressed that...and he wanted to quantify the Vietnamese war. Well, you can't quantify a war like that because it is about people

It's not about quantities of things.

KALBER (VO)

More and more sophisticated hardware arrives in Vietnam. Headquarters reports are more and more optimistic.

McNamara is convinced he has things under control. The crisis has been managed.

MCNAMARA (SOF)

The training aids and the logistic assistance which is being provided by the United States to the South Vietnamese military forces are becoming more and more effective.

CU RUFUS PHILLIPS

2 SHOT MEN UNLOADING` WEAPON

MCNAMARA DISEMBARKS

MS AT PRESS CONFERENCE

MCNAMARA (SOF)

The effectiveness of the U.S. assistance requested by the Vietamese government and provided to the Vietnamese government has greatly increased over the past several months.

MCNAMARA (SOF)

I've been very much encouraged by the progress which the South Vietnamese forces have been making and by the assistance which our forces have rendered to them.

ROSTOW (SOF)

It was limited progress. It was fragile. No one I knew was throwing his hat into the air at the end of '62 and early '63.

ROSTOW (VO)

But the evaluation I think of all hands at the time was that... that the crisis of '61 had been surmounted and that they were on an improving track and without the use of regular American forces.

KENNEDY (VO)

In this year of 1962 we greet each other at Christmas with some special sense of the

CU. ROSTOW

MS MCNAMARA

3 SHOT OF CAPTURED VC

ARVN SEARCHING HAMLET

ZOOM IN TO MS VN CORPSE

LS OF CHRISTMAS TREE

MONTAGE OF CHRISTMAS SCENES

IV-p/7

blessings of peace. This has been a year of peril when the peace has been sorely threatened, but it has been a year when peril was faced and when reason ruled. As a result, we may talk at this Christmas more confidently

PAN CHRISTMAS TREE - LIT

of peace on earth, goodwill to men.

too. A war of national liberation

KALBER (VO)

It is an optimistic Christmas in Vietnam

VN WAR SCENES

ARVN BOARDING HELICOPTER

ZOOM IN TO HELICOPTER

On January 2, 1963, 2300 South Vietnamese troops surprise a Viet Cong batallion of 200 men

MONTAGE OF HELICOPTERS IN AIR at a village called Ap Bac.

is being contained.

HALBERSTAM (VO)

Up til then the Americans had brought in all this gear and they brought their advisers and the Viet Cong force was fighting a guerilla war and the great frustration of the Americans

HELICOPTER LANDS

was...if we could only get the Viet Cong to stand and fight.

IV - p/9

HALBERSTAM (SOF)

Well at Ap Bac we had them trapped and they stood and fought and the ARVN were there with everything. I mean, armored personnel carriers, I mean they had a whole, squadron of them. They had the armored helicopters, they had the whole thing and the ARVN's best division, allegedly best division, the 7th division, absolutely refused to flight, refused to make the assault...

HARKINS (SOF)

We alerted the paratroopers, the cack troops of the Vietnamese then and they were dropped at Ap Bac, but the only landing place that they could...landing zone they could drop in, unless they landed in jungle trees and swamps, was on the wrong side of the village. So when the partroops landed and of course they were responsible for collecting their parachutes, by the time they collected their parachutes, and got together as a fighting unit the Viet Cong had dispersed and disappeared. It was just an unfortunate thing that happened.

CU HARKINS

CU HALBERSTAM

KALBER (VO)

5 American helicopters are shot down. 3 American advisers are killed. 63 Vietnamese die. Half of them shooting at each other.

HARKINS (SOF)

The Vietnamese soldiers had...had the village by the next day. It was a pretty good fight but by noon the next day it was in their hands. They had disappeared. But the Viet Cong had disappeared. They had just fled down the little canals.

DAVIS (VO)

Then you would conclude it was a victory as you reported?

HARKINS (SOF)

It was a victory in that it took a day to win the victory.

KALBER (VO)

.....

Whether it was a victory or not, we have learned a bitter lesson. The army of South Vietnam cannot cope with the Viet Cong, with a committed guerilla enemy.

ARVN IN POST BATTLE SCENE It is trained for conventional war,

fight.

MS HARKINS

CU HARKINS

VN WAR SCENES

LS HELICOPTER

POST BATTLE SCENES

CU HARKINS

VN TROOPS BURNING HAMLET

KALBER (VO)

The war goes on but we have our first hint that perhaps American technology and know-how are not enough that we may need social reform as well as helicopters.

1.1

CU OF VILLAGERS-ANGUISH

to win this war.

2 SHOT PEASANT WOMEN

MS BURNING HAMLET

BURNING

SUPER

ACT V

MONTAGE DIEM, NHU & MME. NHU SMILING

HELICOPTERS IN AIR

KALBER (VO)

Early in 1963 Secretary of State Rusk says Vietnam has "turned a very important corner." He sees a "steady movement toward constitutional system resting on popular consent."

MONTAGE OF AM TROOP ACTION IN FIELD

MONTAGE OF INJURED VIETNAMESE There are now 11,000 Americans in Vietnam. American weapons. Amercan helicopters. American advisers.

The fact is, the war is going badly. Has been since Ap Bac. The political failures of Diem are beginning to affect the war effort.

APPLAUSE

KENNEDY (SOF)

I can report to you that the state of this old but youthful union is good.

KALBER (VØ)

Publicly, the United States remains optimistic. Some estimate the war will be won within a year.

MLS

MCU JFK

V - p/2

KENNEDY (SOF)

The spearpoint of aggression has been blunted in South Vietnam...

KALBER (VO)

Privately, neither the President nor some of his advisers are so optimistic

FORRESTAL (VO)

The President's concern about the country... it was always there, but he began to have doubts about our ability to carry on the policy that we started, really as early as 1962.

GILPATRIC (SOF)

I remember well sitting in at briefings when we'd be given a map of South Vietnam, and there'd be cross-hatched areas and underlined areas, red areas, green areas, each one indicating a degree of government support or

GILPATRIC (VO)

control by the Viet Cong.

MLS

CUT TO CONGRESS FLOOR

LS JFK/JOHNSON/ McCORMICK

JFK LEAVES PODIUM

MS GILPATRIC

PAN OF DEVASTATED AREA

Unfortunately, very often the intelligence upon which those judgments were based were not very sound. So as we became aware of the fragility of our intelligence, it's shortcomings, we sensed that maybe some of our earlier

MONTAGE OF VN WOMEN WEEPING confidence was misplaced.

KALBER (VO)

Some in Washington have insisted the war cannot be won unless Diem makes political and economic reforms.

FORRESTAL (VO)

The argument was always made that to implement land reform in a time of virtual war in the country would undermine the political basis of President Diem's regime.

FORRESTAL (SOF)

So the net result was in the interest of stability. These reforms were never carried out.

MS MICHAEL FORRESTAL

V - p/3

CU ROGER HILSMAN

LS DIEM REVIEWS TROOPS

HILSMAN (SOF)

It was so Wasy for President Diem to put us on. We would send our Ambassador in and mention the need for reforms and the Ambassador and Mr. Diem would agree and say, well, I certainly will do that and nothing would happen.

KALBER (VO)

Diem does not trust Americans. He thinks Kennedy is trying to take control of his country. He trusts no one but his brother Nhu. He sees his army as a weapon to hold power not to fight a war.

He is alone. Isolated from his people.

SLOW ZOOM IN TO MLS DIEM

PAN UP OVER ETERNAL FLAME

CUT TO MONTAGE MONK DEMONSTRATIONS

KALBER (VO)

On May 8 there is a confrontation between Buddhists celebrating the birth of Buddha and Diem's troops. Before it is over 8 Buddhists are dead -- two of them children. Diem's commanders say they were killed by a Viet Cong grenade.

The Buddhists say they were shot by Diem's soldiers. Buddhists begin to demonstrate in cities all over Vietnam. Kennedy's advisers have not expected this development.

FORRESTAL (SOF)

This is hard to believe in hindsight, but my strong recollection is they came as a complete surprise. In fact I recall that it was very difficult to find anyone in our government who knew anything about Buddhism in South Vietnam.

PAN FACES OF VIETNAMESE

KALBER (VO)

A month later a Buddhist monk burns himself to death in the streets of Saigon in protest against Diem's government.

Mme. Nhu says that all that has happened is that a monk has been barbecued.

MS FORRESTAL

MONTAGE OF INJURED

MS MONK IMMOLATION

MS MONK PRAYING

CUT TO MLS IMMO.

LS IMMO.

General Harkins says there is no religious persecution. Ambassador Nolting says the Buddhists' aims "are the same as

those of the Viet Cong."

HALBERSTAM (VO)

To try and understand what the Buddhist crisis was

HALBERSTAM (SOF)

I think you have to look upon it as a vestige of nationalism in Vietnam. And the Buddhists

HALBERSTAM (V)

were untainted by colonial hands, by western language, by western dollars, by western er, er, fellowships, scholarships. They were a pure movement.

CU MONK FACES

CUT TO MS DEMO

anti-Diem. They were

They were anti-foreign, they were

deeply nationalistic and that was their attractiveness.

CU HALBERSTAM

MONTAGE OF BUDDHIST

DEMONSTRATION

KALBER (VO)

In the next 4 months 7 Buddhists will burn themselves to death.

They will focus the attention of the world on what is happening in Vietnam. Diem will refuse to listen to American advice. He will yield nothing to the Buddhists.

PHILLIPS (SOF)

I talked to him about the problem with the Buddhists and I tried to persuade him as a friend that he ought to be making some conciliatory moves.

PHILLIPS (VO)

And I could tell that, you could see a flicker, a sort of doubt go across his eyes.

PHILLIPS (SOF)

But I think that he so depended on his brother at that time that he really had no other recourse, except in his own mind at least, to believe his brother Nhu.

SLOW ZOOM TO PIX OF IMMOLATION

MONTAGE OF FUNERAL SCENES

MCU PHILLIPS

CU PHILLIPS

وسيددد والمرجعة وتربيها ووقائد الأفاد

MS DIEM TALKING

TRAVEL SHOT JFK & AIDE

KALBER (VO)

The President has been willing to allow the United States to compromise on the issue of social reform in order to press

the military effort.

It is a compromise that goes against all he has believed in the past.

FORRESTAL (SOF)

I think he began...he had...he had developed a sense of about to get into a trap. I think the President was worried that events were moving in a direction which might be very hard to reverse, or even become irreversible unless he gave far greater thought to the problem than he had up 'til then.

SLOW ZOOM MS JFK & ADVISERS

KALBER (VO)

On July 4 in Washington the President meets with his advisers.

SLOW ZOOM TO MLS JFK & PRESS

CUT TO CU

MS FORRESTAL

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For the first time they discuss seriously the possibility that

it may be necessary to get rid of the Nhus.

BALL (VO)

From our point of view they were extremely distasteful people

BALL (SOF)

and the totalitarian attitude that they displayed toward the er, Buddhist dissent was such that it was making the position of the United States a very unattractive one.

KALBER (VO)

Kennedy is now faced with a hard decision. What can he do about Nhu. If he does nothing, how long can he go on supporting Diem.

In the opinion of Gen. Harkins and Amb. Nolting who are in Saigon, the seriousness of the crists is exaggerated.

PAN VN FACES

CUT TO CU/STILL

MS BALL

TRAVEL SHOT JFK & RUSK

2 SHOT NOLTING & HARKINS

> COMPAREMENT AND ADDRESS OF ADDRESS AND ADDRESS ADDR ADDRESS ADDRES ADDRESS ADDRES ADDRESS ADDR ADDRESS AD

V - p/10

MS FREDERICK NOLTING

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I definitely felt that under the Diem regime real progress was being made in pacifying the country and in bringing under control the threat of the Viet Cong.

NOLTING (SOF)

PICKETS AT WHITE HOUSE

CUT TO STILLS NSC

MEMBERS

MS

KALEER (VO)

This debate as to whether we can go on supporting Diem becomes what McGeorge Bundy calls "the most divisive issue of the Kennedy administration."

The political conservatives feel our job is to help Diem win the war, not tell him how to run his country. The liberals feel we have to make him reform or get rid of him.

HILSMAN (SOF)

The people in the State Department and the White, House felt that a, it was insulting and demeaning for

CU HILSMAN

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V - p/11

the United States to go on aiding a man who wouldn't even listen to our advice and who was doing things that hurt the United States. Second of all we felt that if... that even if we went on aiding him with the policies he was pursuing it was...he would very quickly... the country would be lost.

KALBER (VO)

In the United States public opinion is aroused against Diem.

Against United States support of Diem. Now the President's options are narrowed.

He is being forced to make a decision that will affect the survival of the Vietnam government.

BALL (VO)

It was either a question of pulling out of Vietnam at that time or having the Diem regime shape up

PICKETS BEFORE WHITE HOUSE

MCU JFK/STILL

ZOOM IN TO XCU JFK

CUT TO MONTAGE OF PICKETS

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BALL (SOF)

or, er, facing the possibility of some other regime coming in:

KALBER (VO)

Thus in the summer of 1963 Vietnam has become a major crisis. The war is no longer so far away. The decisions no longer so simple.

The price of our involvement in Vietnam has gone up. In 3 months it will be the life of Ngo Dinh Diem.

CU BALL

MONTAGE OF JFK/ STILLS

JFK IN OFFICE FREEZE

a service of the second second second

SUPER

KALBER (SOF)

By summer of 1963 John F. Kennedy had begun to feel trapped by Vietnam. When he began his term in the White House it had been a small crisis. He had seen his confrontation with Khruschev as the real foreign policy crisis of his administration. He had not wanted to send American troops to Vietnam or get involved there. But in his first months in office he had had a series of setbacks -- at the Bay of Pigs, in Vienna, in Berlin. He felt he could not afford a "defeat" in Vietnam,

President Kennedy did not accept Gen. Taylor's recommendation to send combat troops to Vietnam. But that report led him to deepen a commitment to a corrupt and inefficient government divorced from its people and to an army without the will to fight.

We tried to save that government and that army with our technology and our know-how. With this began our decisive

MS

ACT VI

MCU

6, 9, 8, 10

VI - p/2

j.

involvement in Vietnam. By the summer of 1963 Kennedy was faced with the choice of continuing to support Diem who was losing the war and who was a dictator who embarrassed us by his undemocratic actions. Or he could acquiesce to the overthrow of Diem.

KALBER (VO)

His decisions and the events that followed in the fall of 1963 are the subject of a second NBS WHITE PAPER tomorrow night: THE DEATH OF DIEM.

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MS WHITE HOUSE PICKETS

LS DIEM IN MOTORCADE

CUT TO MONK DEMONSTRATION CUT TO MS DIEM CUT TO CU JFK CUT TO MONKS DEMOS CUT TO WHITE HOUSE PICKETS PULL BACK FROM DIEM CORPSE AND FREEZE SUPER TITLE